1. Introduction 1.1. In which medium have we observed the most significant trans-regional cultural dynamics in the first decade of the 21 st century? On the internet. This diagnosis is true not only in global respects but also with regard to contemporary countries which are nowadays regarded as a part of the imagined entity of Eurasia.
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That is why it seems appropriate to address the question of cultural dynamics in contemporary Russia and Eurasia by focusing on the internet. In this paper I aim to discuss the role the Russian-based Runet plays for Eurasian 2 I deliberately refrain from providing any geographic definition of Eurasia in the beginning of my paper because I will later propose a tentative cyberlinguistic understanding of the imagined entity of Eurasia. Without doubt the countries of the Socialist Second World share a political legacy of totalitarian experiences, but does "Post-Totalitarian Eurasia" (Saunders 2009 :1) still constitute a coherent "Second World", a world living in the mode "After" (Kujundžić 2000) ?
Does the feature of post-communism as advocated by Boris Groys (2005) really predetermine the future of the former communist countries by redirecting them back from the communist utopia to the past? 6 The exclusive focus on the past -on historical trauma and memory 5 In her bibliography, published -according to the bibliographical information -in AlmaAta in 1986, Akasheva still speaks of "Russian Soviet literature of Kazakhstan", whereas in the continuation of 2002, published already in Almaty, she refers only to "Russian literature in Kazakhstan" and stresses that " [р] усская литература союзных республик, являясь «потоком» русской литературы, одновременно принадлежала инонациональному литературному процессу, ориентируясь на его традиции." [The Russian literature of the federal republics (of the Soviet Union), while being one of the 'streams' of Russian literature, at the same time belonged to a hetero-national literary process and oriented itself towards the traditions of that process.] (Akasheva 2002:3). 6 " [A] us der Zukunft in die Vergangenheit" (Groys 2005:48) . Petersburg, and Split bristle with cyber-cafés, mobile phone users, and hipster digerati, while Tirana, Tyumen', and Tashkent languish in virtual cul-de-sacs far from the information superhighway." (Saunders 2009 :2, cf. also Hann et al. 2002:12) From this one might deduce the necessity of a regional turn in the various models of post-totalitarian, post-Second World, post-communist, post-socialist, post-Cold War and post-colonial studies.
2.3. Possessing some common features with the other "post-countries", the Central
Asian republics share other characteristics with South Asia, with the Muslim world etc.
which makes it attractive to describe them in terms of in-betweenness. This notion occurs as an implicit diagnosis in many research texts, not only in those that are informed by postcolonial studies:
"Kazakhstan is a country at the periphery of three major civilizations, the ArabIranian Muslim, the European Christian and the South-Asian Buddhist world. A whole range of oppositions define its present status. Kazakhstan is not Europe, but not Asia either; it is a post-Soviet, but at the same time a postcolonial country; […] Kazakh is by law the official state language, but Russian remains in usage."
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Could a similar in-betweenness serve as a distinctive feature of a more strictly confined region, including Russia and the former southern republics of the Soviet Union but excluding the Baltic and East Central Europe? Might the notion of in-betweenness, which is 8 "Kasachstan ist ein Land an der Peripherie der drei großen Zivilisationen, der arabischiranisch muslimischen, der europäisch christlichen und der südasiatisch buddhistischen Welt. Eine ganze Reihe von Oppositionen bestimmen seinen gegenwärtigen Zustand: Kasachstan ist nicht Europa, aber auch nicht Asien; es ist einerseits ein postsowjetisches Land, aber zugleich auch ein Postkolonialland; […] ; die kasachische Sprache ist zwar per Gesetz die Staatssprache, dennoch bleibt das Russische weiterhin im Gebrauch." (Ibraeva 2005:407 The new global label, however, is not accompanied by a new all-embracing conceptualisation of the cultural peculiarities of post-Soviet Central Asia. It rather provides the general framework for specialised, regionally differentiated area studies. One of the research fields which has not gained much attention yet is Central Asian internet studies.
The Russian concept of (Neo) Eurasianism is viewed in different ways in the Central Asian republics. It is either identified as an ideological mask for Russian hegemonic aspirations or as a promising synthesis (cf. Hann et al. 2002:14 3.1. After the breakdown of the Soviet Union millions of Russian native speakers found themselves in a "beached diaspora" (Laitin 1998:29) . The new Kazakhstan consisted of over 100 ethnic groups, among which Kazakhs and Russians are by far the biggest, which
gives one the right to speak of an almost bi-national Kazakh-Russian populace in Kazakhstan.
Ethnic Russians are concentrated in the North and the East of Kazakhstan (Kadyrshanow 1996:15.26 ), the only area in Central Asia where there is a common border with Russia. The new interstate border cut the ties of the Northern territories of the Kazakh Soviet Republic with the Russian Federation. The North's economy is directly dependent on the neighbouring Russian industry (Olcott 1997:113) , and roads connect Kazakhstan's North with Russia rather than with the rest of Kazakhstan (cf. Olcott 2002:195) . Thus on the cognitive map of the North-Kazakhstan Russian population the old orientation towards Russia remained immanent (Braun 2000:92) .
This cognitive map was challenged by what appeared at first glance to be typical post-colonial attempts of Kazakh officials 9 towards "a deliberate 'removal' of the 'colonial' language from the public sphere" in the Central Asian republics in the early 1990s (Pavlenko 2008a:282) . Russian toponyms were Kazakhised (for example One of the official strategies for providing a cultural memory which unites all inhabitants of Kazakhstan -and of other parts of the former Soviet Union -is the argument that they were all victims of Soviet colonial repression: "The entire history of the Soviet Union, beginning with the revolution in 1917, is a history of violation of human rights and even of genocide […] " (Nazarbaev 1998:110 (Shaibakova 2004) . Simultaneously the role of Russian in administration and education was downgraded (Pavlenko 2008a:282-283) . Nevertheless it would be too simple to approach the Kazakh case with the topos of minority rights (in this case for the big Russian minority) which must be defended alone. The generalisation of all Central Asian states as "nationalising regimes" (Smith et al. 1998 :139-164, still defended in Dave 2007 which prevailed in studies of nationalism in the 1990s is evidently inconsistent with regard to binational Kazakhstan, because the "ethnic redress" (Schatz 2000:493) is only one side of the coin in Kazakhstani internal policy. Justified fears of a "logic of titular nationalism" 10 and Kazakhisation arose in the mid-1990s (Akiner 1995:71-72) , but in the long run Kazakhstan witnessed fewer linguistically motivated conflicts than the neighbouring republics (Halbach 2007:89) . Thus the impression that the Russian milieu in Kazakhstan is "narrowing" is deceiving (Ileuova 2008).
3.2. Despite government support for the Kazakh language in official contexts the media situation remains plural. The media law of 1999 prescribing that 50 % of all media programmes must be in Kazakh and only 20 % may consist of rebroadcast material from abroad could not be fulfilled by the media (Adams et al. 2007:85) . A majority of the mass media still publishes or broadcasts in Russian (Shaibakova 2004:180; Kaftan 2004; Bensmann 2007:536-537) . The blocking of Russian TV from Kazakhstan's broadcasting network in the mid-1990s was neutralised by satellite receivers (Bensmann 2007:533 
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"Logik des Titularnationalismus" (Kadyrshanow 1996:6) . 4.3. As far as internet control is concerned, Kazakhstan adopted the Russian model of special registration software obligatory for all internet providers (Deibert et al. 2008:181 ).
Kazakhstan's centralised internet control became discernible in 2005 when Kazakhtelekom blocked the webpage www.borat.kz (Saunders 2006b:236) . This censoring strategy was subsequently questioned by (younger) Kazakhstani officials (Saunders 2006b:242) to the internet, the connection of space and language cannot be described in terms of geolinguistics, but of virtual linguistics. And since Russian-language usage of the internet in Nazarbaev's "Eurasia" is a communicative reality, it possesses a higher degree of performative practicality than the imagined spaces of geopoetics (Marszałek/Sasse 2010).
Due to the decentralised nature of the web, this communicative, cyberlinguistic space can only vaguely be circumscribed because its concrete localities are extremely difficult to grasp.
For the proto-Eurasian Russian webspace national boundaries are relevant only in the case of filtering (Deibert et al. 2008 ).
When developing similar cyberlingual criteria for the Eurasian virtual space,
one must not fall back into the assumption of stable identities or continuous linguistic habits.
As in the case of the multiple identities which the multinational citizens of Kazakhstan combine in themselves (cf. Schatz 2000) , there are multiple cyberlingual habits as well. The linguistic habits of the Russian-using web community vary depending on the communicative, interactive or consumerist purpose of their internet usage. The Russophone identity of the Eurasian web community provides no more than a situational linguistic habit. Kolstø observed that supra-ethnic linguistic identities as "Russophones" were seen as "politically incorrect" in Kazakhstan (1998:63) . Thus naive diffusion models of technological development (Ellis 1999 , Rose 2006 The advocates of a Russian world have detected the implicit, subcutaneous "propaganda" effect of the Runet:
"The Runet is an 'impersonal' but highly effective carrier of the language, the very .ru-zone which gives all users the possibility to get information and communicate
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"Русский мир -это не только русские, не только россияне, не только наши соотечественники в странах ближнего и дальнего зарубежья, эмигранты, выходцы из России и их потомки. Это еще и иностранные граждане, говорящие на русском языке, изучающие или преподающие его, все те, кто искренне интересуется Россией, кого волнует ее будущее." (Russkii mir, http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/fund/about, accessed 30 May 2010). 
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So far the actual effects of Russkii mir's internet-based linguistic imperialism in the near abroad seem insignificant.
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But the possibility that the Russian minority in Kazakhstan could be targeted by Russkii mir as a "fifth column" and that the foundation's traditional linguistic imperialism may advance to more modern means of linguistic cyberimperialism cannot be denied.
Resistance by emulation
What are the Kazakhstanis' strategies of resistance to the potential new Russian linguistic-cyberimperialistic threat?
8.1. It would be misleading to return to the outdated research stereotype of "nationalising regimes" (Smith et al. 1998:139-164) "Рунет -это «неодушевленный», но весьма эффективный носитель языка, та самая зона .ru, которая дает возможность воспринимать информацию и общаться всем пользователям независимо от гражданства и тем самым расширять русскоязычное пространство." (Iatsenko 2007 ). . It is more post-colonial in the temporal than anti-colonial in the antagonistic sense.
8.3. One expression of this emulative-defensive strategy can be found in the inclusive and embracing logic of argumentation of the "both … and…" type. On the object level this was already observed in the existing research literature, for example concerning Nazarbaev's "balancing act between russification and nativization" (Pavlenko 2008a:302) or his deliberate avoidance of "making a choice between an ethnic and a civic nation concept" (Kolstø 1998:56) . Nazarbaev tried to give the impression that he was "both forward-and backwardlooking" (Saunders 2006b:244) and pursued "both a multinational society and a homeland for the ethnic Kazakhs at the same time" (Kolstø 1998:56) .
The vagueness and apparent contradiction of Nazarbaev's inclusive arguments as diagnosed in research literature is not a problem for understanding this strategy but the solution for a better understanding itself. Differing from antagonistic postcolonial attitudes, this "both… and…" strategy tries to overcome the being "in the gap" as it is known from Petr Chaadaev's famous first Filosoficheskoe pis'mo [Philosophical Letter] , according to which Russia belonged "neither to the Occident nor to the Orient". (Savitskii et al. 1996:4) But then the authors Savitskii, Suvchinskii, Trubetskoi and Florovskii advocate a new figure of "inclusion of a whole circle of East European and Asian peoples into the mental sphere of the culture of the Russian world" (Savitskii et al. 1996:4) . The functional relationship between the argumentative tropes of exclusion and inclusion becomes clear from the following quote: "[…] Russia is not merely 'the West' but also 'the East,', not only 'Europe' but also 'Asia,' and even not Europe at all, but 'Eurasia'" (Savitskii 1996:6) . Internal inclusion (Eurasia) serves as a means for external exclusion (of Europe).
A comparable functional sequence of inclusion for the sake of exclusion can be found in Russian Neoeurasianism, as Alexander Höllwerth described in his analysis of the obscure logic of Aleksandr Dugin's argumentation: "The 'logic of connecting' is always an instrument of the 'logic of division'." Eurasianism has served as a philosophical model which the Kazakh government propagated actively (Khruslov 2006:148) and that can be institutionally seen in the example of the L.N.
Gumilyov Eurasian National University in Astana, which in its self-description links the 36 "Die ‚Logik des Verbindens' ist dabei stets ein Instrument der ‚Logik des Trennens'." (Höllwerth 2007:702 In camouflaging the purpose of division under a cover of multiple connections, Nazarbaev is diplomatically more successful 39 than the Russian Eurasianists who -in every generation -have not held back from declaring that among the Eurasian peoples "the Russian people has the central position" (Savitskii et al. 1996:4, sic) . Nevertheless the similarity in the connecting-disconnecting or including-excluding strategies is striking. One might risk providing a second, rather abstract, non-spatial (and slightly ironic) definition of Eurasia:
"Eurasian" is a rhetoric of inclusion for the sake of pragmatic exclusion.
Unsurprising Coincidences
10.1. This Kazakhstani "Eurasian" logic displays rather unsurprising coincidences with various Russian, Soviet, post-Soviet and post-colonial argumentative logics. As seen above, the Kazakhstani and the Russian Eurasianisms share a connection-dividing logic. The Nazarbaev administration's ambiguous russification and kazakhisation cannot deny its traces in Soviet language policy. As Schatz diagnoses:
"Post-Soviet Kazakhstani internationalism was shaped by many of the discursive and institutional legacies of its Soviet-era predecessor. As in the Soviet era, the Kazakhstani elite propagated ambiguous cultural categories designed for universalistic appeal and broad resonance." (Schatz 2000:491) The Kazakhstani preservation of the "colonial" language Russian as a means of interethnic communication is akin to the majority of African post-colonial countries, which retained the former colonial languages for the analogous purpose of transregional, interethnic and international communication (cf. Pavlenko 2008a:300).
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One needs to distinguish this authoritarian strategy of inclusion from a postmodern paradoxical inclusion of contradictions. Nazarbaev, however, made a postmodern attempt of self-defuting when he changed Kazakhstan's politics towards Borat, becoming self-ironic and therefore ultimately embracing all contradictions (Saunders 2008:127 "A rational solution would be a 'both… and…', a balanced bilinguality."
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The German scholar even subscribes to the topos of Kazakhstanis as predestined to think in Eurasian inclusive categories (Eschment 1998:117) . Akasheva, Salima S. 1986. Russkaia sovetskaia literature Kazakhstana (1917 Kazakhstana ( -1980 :
Bibliograficheskii ukazatel'. Alma-Ata.
"Eine rationale Lösung läge in einem Sowohl-Als-Auch, in einer ausgewogenen Zweisprachigkeit […] " (Eschment 1998:45 
